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Introduction
Climate-Compatible Development (CCD) has been proposed as a conceptual framework for mainstreaming climate change mitigation and adaptation within development efforts. It was defined by Mitchell and Maxwell (2010: 1) as "development that minimises the harm caused by climate impacts, while maximising the many human development opportunities presented by a low emissions, more resilient future". Key terms related to the concept of CCD are defined in Table 1 . These broad, mainstream definitions provide a useful conceptual lens through which to consider CCD and have been influential in shaping its formation. However, it is acknowledged that these terms are often understood diversely, used interchangeably and co-opted for instrumental purposes within research and practice (e.g. Ireland, 2012) . Development A function of the socio-cultural, political and economic freedom of individuals and groups (Sen, 2001) .
Mitigation
Human action to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (Agard and Schipper, 2014) .
Adaptation
Anticipatory or reactive actions which enable adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects (Agard and Schipper, 2014) .
Vulnerability
A function of exposure to climate and development shocks, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Agard and Schipper, 2014) .
Triple-wins
The simultaneous achievement of development, mitigation and adaptation benefits (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010) .
Multi-stakeholder working between actors across global, national and local scales is required for CCD benefits to be delivered . Stakeholders are defined here as actors or organisations with an interest in, or who are impacted by, CCD (adapted from Freeman 1984). They include donor agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private sector organisations, researchers, community-based organisations (CBOs), national and local governments, consultants, technical experts and local people (Bryan et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2015) . Contributions from different stakeholders working across diverse sectors and scales allows linkages between development, mitigation and adaptation to be harnessed (Stringer et al., 2012) ; trade-offs to be minimised (Kaur and Ayers, 2010) ; and opportunities to be exploited (Corbera et al., 2007) . However, CCD multi-stakeholder working is not without its challenges (e.g. Pinkse and Kolk, 2012; Harvey, 2010) .
Procedural justice requires that stakeholders are able to participate and have their preferences recognised (Schlosberg, 2007) , in this case, through CCD project design.
Participation refers to the opportunities that individuals and groups have to take part in decision-making (Hurlbert and Gupta, 2015) ; recognition is achieved when their identities, cultures and values are acknowledged (Tschakert, 2009) . Procedural justice can create pathways to distributive justice: views considered within decisionmaking processes shape subsequent patterns of societal benefits and costs (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013) . However, with only a few exceptions (e.g. Fisher, 2015; Paavola and Adger, 2006; Comim, 2008) , procedural justice has been overlooked within climate change research.
There have been few attempts to evaluate whether and how CCD design reconciles the preferences of multiple stakeholders (e.g. Mathur et al., 2014; Sova et al., 2015) . Empirical insights from project-level initiatives which explicitly pursue triple-wins are particularly scarce. Consequently, it is unclear to what extent CCD project designs are being configured by bottom-up, organic and/or top-down, paternalistic belief-systems.
Also seldom considered are relationships between procedural justice and powernetworks of societal institutions (formal and informal) and resources. Yet these networks delimit the boundaries and scope of procedural justice opportunities and therefore warrant consideration (Gaventa, 2006) . A shortage of tools and frameworks for holistically exploring procedural justice in the context of power betrays this.
Consideration of who is 'driving' CCD design has intrinsic value but it is also important because development, mitigation and adaptation outcomes are experienced differently across diverse temporal and spatial scales (Klein et al., 2007) .
Understanding whether and how different components are prioritised and balanced against one another within design processes can help signpost: whether and when the concept is being used instrumentally and; which individuals and groups might 'win'
and 'lose' as a result of its operationalisation. CCD professes to be a 'development 8 first' approach which aims to help people improve their lives in the face of climate threats without exacerbating these threats for current and future generations (Picot and Moss, 2014) . However, limited consideration of procedural justice and its links with power means it is uncertain how projects contend with wider patterns of sociocultural and political oppression which have caused patterns of underdevelopment (Sen 2001 ).
This article therefore explores procedural justice opportunities and power within the design of two donor-funded projects that pursue CCD triple-wins in Malawi. Together, the projects form the Enhancing Community Resilience Programme (ECRP) which seeks to improve the lives of over 600,000 vulnerable Malawians. In this article we: 1) develop a framework for exploring the procedural justice implications of CCD in the context of power; 2) identify different stakeholders' priorities for CCD project design; and 3) evaluate which stakeholders were recognised by, and able to participate in, design processes.
Designing CCD: procedural justice and multi-stakeholder preferences
Professional CCD stakeholders comprise individuals, or organisations with employees, who earn a living through work related to mitigation, adaptation and/or development. They commit resources which enable projects (e.g. finance from donor agencies; knowledge from researchers and consultants; implementation expertise from NGOs and CBOs). Consequently, their voices are often considered through CCD design processes (Sova et al., 2015; Mathur et al., 2014) .
Social justice requires that the individuals and groups which projects intend to benefit can pursue ends which they value (Sen, 2009) . Just CCD therefore requires that local people can participate in (if they so choose), and have their preferences recognised through, design processes. Involving local people in design can: help them expand their intellectual capabilities (Alkire, 2005) ; enable understanding of conditions which facilitate their engagement in implementation; and help ensure that project outcomes improve their lives (Gustavsson et al., 2014; Huq and Khan, 2006) . However, achieving these benefits is unlikely when local people are involved in a tokenistic 9 manner and/or populations are considered socially homogenous or knowledge poor.
In such cases, vulnerable individuals and groups can even be detrimentally affected ).
Successfully achieving CCD wins is often contingent on multi-stakeholder engagement in project design (Harvey, 2010) , which can also help reduce implementation costs (Skutsch and Ba, 2010; Larrazábal et al., 2012) and encourage longer-lasting benefits (Peskett et al., 2008) . Hence, stakeholder recognition and participation within design processes could make CCD effective and efficient, as well as socially just. Accordingly, policy standards (e.g. REDD+, the Clean Development
Mechanism and voluntary carbon markets) mandate that stakeholder preferences are considered at the outset of interventions with potential to create CCD outcomes (UNFCCC, 2006; UNFCCC, 2011; CCBA, 2013) .
CCD operates in a context where multiple forms of uncertainty mean a plurality of values and interests coexist and conflict with one another (Sen, 2009; Curry and Webster, 2011) . Debate about what is to be developed, and how development should take place, is commonplace, irrespective of concerns about climate change (Sachs, 1997; Sen, 2001; Easterly and Easterly, 2006) . Key issues related to how mitigation and adaptation should proceed are contentious: disagreement between nation-states over both has caused global climate negotiations to stall (Ngwadla, 2014) . Often, developing nations prioritise adaptation and development over mitigation in order to reduce global inequalities (Ibid.; Ayers and Huq, 2009) . By contrast, organisations developing carbon market projects have prioritised mitigation goals ).
Professional stakeholders have collaborated successfully to design CCD, reconciling diverse perspectives (Corbera et al., 2007; Dyer et al., 2013) . However, when projects are not led by public sector organisations, national and local governments are sometimes absent from design processes. Projects funded through voluntary carbon markets are not obliged to involve host governments (Benessaiah, 2012) and have not always considered their preferences (Mathur et al., 2014) . Likewise, private sector CSR activities have been designed in isolation from government and relevant NGO and civil society representatives (Leventon et al., 2015) . Questions have been raised about the accountability of projects which operate without host government involvement (Spiro, 2002) , as well as their implications for state sovereignty (Whitfield, 2008 Local people often desire a prominent role in CCD decision-making processes (Cromberg et al., 2014; Atela et al., 2015 ). Yet evidence of design which has successfully reconciled professional stakeholders' and local people's preferences is scarce. Awono et al. (2014) showcase an exception of village residents targeted by carbon forestry projects in Cameroon who were encouraged to propose ways in which their livelihoods could be improved. As a consequence, activities such as housing, beekeeping and agroforestry were advocated for by local people, and some of these activities were incorporated within project design. Likewise, local people were able to identify activities for implementation under a voluntary carbon market project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mathur et al., 2014) .
Nevertheless, significant evidence suggests that CCD design is often 'top-down' and 'expert-led'; local-level involvement is minimal and decisions are imposed on target populations (Kalame et al., 2011; Mustalahti et al., 2012; Sova et al., 2015; Atela et al., 2015; Leach and Scoones, 2013) . Sometimes, 'expert' knowledge imported from abroad is unsuitable within local contexts. For example, Leventon et al. (2015) reflect on how conservation agriculture techniques from Zimbabwe were incorporated within CCD project design in Zambia; techniques were incongruous with local conditions and local people achieved reduced crop yields compared to those achieved before the project began.
Key design decisions (e.g. identifying a project's aim and objectives, implementation timescales and so on) are often taken prior to any community-engagement (Kalame et al., 2011; Awono et al., 2014) . This can occur when climate finance funds interventions because upward accountability to international frameworks outweighs downward accountability to local people (Awono et al., 2014; Boyd, 2009 ).
Professional stakeholders have justified limited local involvement in CCD design by stressing that it can encourage unrealistic expectations around projects (Cromberg et al. 2014 ).
Even when local people are involved at the design stage, methodological limitations can obscure and conceal their preferences. Discourses emphasising the merits of 'participation' have led to various tools being developed for assessing local priorities.
Tools increasingly encourage local people to self-assess their own vulnerability (Van Aalst et al., 2008) . However, vulnerability parameters are often pre-determined and opportunities to suggest solutions for overcoming vulnerability and/or evaluate intervention designs are withheld (Alkire, 2005) . Moreover, the expense involved in conducting participatory assessments can mean only limited 'samples' of local people have opportunities to take part (Kalame et al., 2011) .
Restricted participatory opportunities can result in local people's misrecognition because their priorities are ill-considered within design (Kalame et al., 2011; Hardee and Mutunga, 2010; Atela et al., 2015) . For example, Mustalahti et al. (2012) show that a carbon forestry project in Tanzania failed to integrate local priorities (water access, food security, housing, improved infrastructure, income-generating activities) because they were not conducive with mitigation goals. Likewise, misrecognition also occurs when participatory opportunities are focussed at, or aggregated to, the community-level and diverse and/or dissenting preferences are overlooked (Bours et al., 2014) .
Local people's recognition is linked to CCD having their informed consent (Resodudarmo et al., 2012) . Strictly speaking, this would mean people choosing activities to participate in based upon their full understanding of all available information pertaining to these activities (Alkire 2005) . However, low education levels may complicate this (HDI 2015) . Moreover, worldviews of local people in developing countries are often grounded in indigenous values which can be at odds with western science (Hulme, 2011) . Gaining informed consent for CCD on such stringent terms, especially mitigation activities (which require an understanding of the causes of climate change), may therefore be difficult.
Research has yet to holistically explore how power influences stakeholder participation and recognition within CCD design. (Byigero et al., 2010) . Limited local participation in project design is attributed to low education levels and opportunity costs of engaging in alternative livelihood activities (Gustavsson et al., 2014; Mathur et al., 2014) . Local people's restricted access to decision-making processes (hidden power -see above)
has also been used to explain their non-involvement. However, invisible power is seldom considered. Sova et al. (2015) are an exception: they find that local concerns are considered of secondary importance to 'expert' knowledge within national adaptation planning in seven Least Developed Countries.
Evidence shows that despite being crucial for ensuring socially-just, effective and efficient CCD, reconciling stakeholder perspectives within project design processes is challenging. Non-involvement is sometimes explained by visible and hidden forms of power. However, barriers to procedural justice may be concealed by restricted consideration of invisible power. In the following section, a theoretical framework is presented which facilitates holistic exploration of power and procedural justice within CCD project design.
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Research approach and methods
Research context and case study approach
Malawi was chosen as a research location because: a) it is amongst the world's most vulnerable countries; and b) projects which pursue CCD goals are already being implemented in the country. Malawi is considered to be "the most climate vulnerable country in mainland Africa" (Barrett, 2013 (Barrett, : 1821 . The country also faces stark development challenges (UNDP, 2012) . Malawian populations could therefore benefit substantially from CCD projects which aim to generate development gains while reducing exposure and sensitivity to climate impacts.
Malawi's policy infrastructure facilitates CCD projects by encouraging the use of subnational projects to advance development, mitigation and adaptation (GoM, 2012) . 12 projects which pursued CCD goals were identified nationally via 24 semi-structured interviews with climate and development professionals (completed in April 2014).
Integrated climate and development project documentation, found using internet searches, was used to identify initial interviewees. A snowball sampling approach distinguished additional respondents (Atkinson and Flint, 2001 ).
The Developing Innovative Solutions with Communities to Overcome Vulnerability through Enhanced Resilience (DISCOVER) project and Enhancing Community
Resilience Project (ECRP-CA) were chosen for further study because they have the most wide-reaching procedural justice implications of the 12 identified projects. The selected projects are larger (DISCOVER targets 305,000 beneficiaries; ECRP-CA targets 298,500) and have received more financial support (£21.5million over a fiveyear period combined) than other projects within the initial sample. Together, they form the Enhancing Community Resilience Programme (ECRP), which is financed by UK, Norwegian and Irish Government grants.
Both projects began in September 2011 and transcend the agriculture, forestry and energy sectors. Both aim to achieve a range of development goals and help households adapt to the consequences of: dry spells and drought; heavy rains and 14 flooding; and strong winds. Project activities are intended to be carbon neutral or able to contribute to carbon savings. Links between the projects' activities and development, mitigation and adaptation goals are outlined in Table 2 In each district, two villages were chosen as study sites. The advice of project field staff was sought to ensure that villages were: made up of similar numbers of households; close to each other geographically; targeted with similar project activities.
However, in Dedza and Kasungu, two villages with different average levels of household resource wealth were purposively chosen based on field staff advice. This allowed consideration of whether and how household priorities for project design differed accordingly.
Working with field staff was crucial for securing introductions to, and building trust with, households in study villages. However, information provided by field staff may have been biased in ways unbeknown to the researcher. In an attempt to reduce possible bias, information obtained from field staff was verified through researcher observations of household resources, wealth ranking exercises (see below) and discussions with local people throughout the process of data collection. Survey responses were sought from a random sample of 50% of consenting households in each village. Coding techniques were used to analyse survey data and identify key themes related to household recognition and participation (Babbie, 2008) .
Material collection and analysis
A purposive sampling approach was then adopted to select household interviewees for semi-structured interviews in order to follow up on these themes (Teddlie and Yu, 2007) . A participatory approach (Jefferies et al., 2005) was used to develop indicators so that the responses of 'less-than-average wealth', 'average-wealth' and 'higherthan-average wealth' households could be distinguished. Levels of participation within wealth rankings are seen as positively correlated to their precision and local appropriateness (Chambers, 1994) .
Semi-structured interviews were also used to gather qualitative data from 32 professional stakeholders: two donor agency employees; 21 NGO employees; one national and eight local government employees. All stakeholders were asked about their preferences (development, mitigation, adaptation, other) for project design and whether they were afforded opportunities to articulate these preferences and shape decision-making. (DDG, 2013; NDG, 2014; NDG, 2015; KDG, 2013) ; and two consultancy reports (LTSI, 2014; Phiri, 2010) .
Content analysis (Babbie, 2008) and critical discourse analysis techniques were used to analyse the data (Fairclough, 1992) . Univariate analysis techniques were used to analyse statistics derived through amalgamating survey data (Babbie, 2008) . A framework which builds upon Gaventa's (2006) 'power cube' approach was developed to evaluate the extent to which stakeholder priorities were reconciled through ECRP project design (Figure 2 ). This allowed for exploration of whether and how different stakeholders were afforded recognition and participatory opportunities within the project design 'space'.
Stakeholder opportunities to participate and have their preferences recognised within ECRP Design Space were considered. The Design Space comprised those opportunities and channels through which programme and project design was determined. Hurlbert and Gupta's (2015) 'split ladder of participation' was used to analyse the depth of participatory opportunities which existed. Hurlbert and Gupta's typology is an advance on hierarchical alternatives (e.g. Arnstein, 1969; Choguill, 1996; Pretty, 1995) which consider participation as symptomatic of binary power struggles between governing bodies and citizens. Rather, theirs acknowledges that:
participation often comprises collective action involving multiple different stakeholders who 'learn' together (social learning); stakeholders participate for diverse reasons; and the appropriate form of participation depends on the policy problem being addressed.
Figure 2 sets out four quadrants of the split ladder. Table 3 describes each quadrant.
Locating participatory opportunities within different quadrants allows appraisal of whether they are circumstantially appropriate and pertinent to the policy problem being addressed. ECRP design represented an unstructured problem because: knowledge of future climate impacts was (and remains) uncertain (ECRP, No Date); and stakeholders held diverse preferences for CCD design. Therefore, the achievement of procedural justice required that decision-making was based on significant deliberation between stakeholders (see Quadrant 4, Table 3 ).
Issues of recognition and participation feed back on one another. An inductive approach was used to identify instances within the data where local people's identities, cultures and values were (mis)recognised. Constant comparison techniques were used to identify linkages between individual instances, allowing patterns of (mis)recognition to emerge (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) .
Procedural justice spaces emerge, and are contested at, diverse governance levels (Gaventa, 2006 
Quadrant 2
 Policy problems are structured: there is substantive agreement on norms, principles and aims between stakeholders.  Technocratic decision-making which represents stakeholder interests is possible.  Decision-makers may interact with stakeholders to educate them about the specifics of decisions taken: information flows in one direction only.  Social learning extends to incremental changes and the improvement of existing practices ('single-loop learning').
Quadrant 3
 Policy problems are moderately structured: stakeholders share trust but facts may be uncertain or there is some disagreement over values, norms or approaches for achieving goals.  Stakeholders are highly engaged in the process of decision-making: they have opportunities to shape opinions, ideas and outcomes. They may selfmanage projects, autonomously setting goals and being provided with resources for realising them.  Iterative information flows allows assumptions to be reflected on and questioned, allowing for decisions which foster substantive change where required ('double-loop learning').
Quadrant 4
 Policy problems are unstructured: there is great uncertainty in knowledge and value positions are disparate.  Solutions can appear intractable and require significant debate and discussion between stakeholders.  Extensive participatory opportunities are required to develop trust and common understanding. Even then consensus may be unattainable.  Deeply-held value positions and norms are scrutinised, leading to rich understanding of the decision-making context ('triple-loop learning').  When consensus is reached, subsequent decision-making may be undertaken within Quadrant 3 (shown by dashed arrow connecting Quadrants 3 and 4 in Figure 2 ).
Results
Opportunities for professional stakeholders and local people to participate and have their preferences recognised are set out in turn. For confidentiality purposes, interviewees and survey respondents are anonymised. Only the stakeholder groups that interviewees represent are documented.
Professional stakeholders
The Design Space was an invited space (Gaventa, 2006) and reducing economic poverty (donor agency employee).
In April 2011, donors invited NGOs to propose project designs for implementing ECRP. Through communications with prospective consortia, donors set out a prescriptive overarching framework for project design. Four key principles informed the framework (Table 4) . Principles balance upward and downward accountability.
They aimed to ensure that: projects are tailored to local conditions; local people can participate in activities and receive significant, long-lasting benefits. However, projects must also provide value-for-money (DfID, 2011) and meet developed country policy goals: upward accountability to donor governments and their tax-paying citizens. The framework dictated that ECRP projects pursued triple-wins across development, mitigation and adaptation. Donors commissioned a consultant to review disaster riskreduction and adaptation programmes and projects in Malawi: "information which would assist in the development of the design" (Phiri, 2010) . This occurred through discussions with NGO personnel responsible for interventions but local people's views were not considered. Results stressed that project adaptation and development goals should be pursued through multiple mutually reinforcing "soft", community-and ecosystem-based project activities rather than "hard" engineering-based activities (Phiri 2010) .
Activities with mitigation co-benefits (e.g. solar energy, improved cookstoves and afforestation) were prioritised: "a win-win approach" (donor agency employee).
According to two NGO employees, low-carbon approaches are "high on their [DfID's] agenda" because they "fit into the bigger UK policy agenda [ Overall, NGOs were afforded Quadrant 3 participation ( Figure 2 , Table 3 ): information flows with donors were iterative but consortia members were recognised as technical, rather than strategic, decision-makers; responsible for proposing specific implementation strategies within the context of the overarching framework set out by donors.
National and local government policy documents were consulted during project design. Project development and adaptation goals and specific activities implemented by the project (Table 2) largely reflect national and local government preferences for development and adaptation (GoM, 2006; GoM, 2011; NDG, 2014; KDG, 2013; DDG, 2013 (GoM, 2012: 10) and local levels (two district government employees).
Nevertheless, there was dissatisfaction amongst national government actors, who perceived that they were side-lined from decision-making (hidden powerlessness). Documentary review suggests that PVCA design adopted a flexible approach which allowed households to define vulnerability in a locally-appropriate way. Households were also given scope to suggest solutions to climate and development problems (ECRP-CA, 2011). However, they were unable to take any decisions relating to project design: hidden powerlessness. They were recognised only as information providers;
Local people
PVCA processes encouraged a one-way flow of information from local people to NGOs and donors (ECRP-CA, 2012; DISCOVER, 2012) . Tables 5 and 6 . Using surveys, we asked households to rate the importance of ECRP development goals using a scale of 0-3: 0 meant goals were perceived to be unimportant for improving the lives of household members; 3 meant goals were perceived as extremely important (Table 5) . Similarly, households were also asked to rate how problematic they perceived particular climate shocks to be (Table 6 ). However, donor rationales for including low-carbon technologies within projects are not understood by households; knowledge of what greenhouse gases are or how they affect the climate is minimal. 37% of household survey respondents were unsure why weather patterns change over long periods of time. 52% believed trees were the most important regulators of climate: "trees help to bring in rainfall". Commonly, this reflected a belief that God rewards villages who look after natural resources with good weather. Only two household respondents reported that greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change. Therefore, households chose to participate in low-carbon activities based on perceived benefits associated with an indigenous worldview rather than scientific knowledge of climate change.
Development goals -electricity access, new cooking technologies -pursued through household solar lighting and improved cookstove adoption, which produce mitigation co-benefits, were least highly prized by households (Table 5) . Less-thanaverage, elderly-headed and female-headed households gave these goals the lowest importance ratings. They routinely rated goals as "not very important" or "not important at all". Electricity access and new cooking technologies' importance ratings were lower-than-average in Nsanje: a district considered amongst the most vulnerable in
Malawi (NDG, 2015) . One less-than-average household head in Dedza described electricity access as a "luxury". A less-than-average female household head from Nsanje said that "electricity, through solar or another way, is not important for us at all.
What matters to our household is good shelter and food". Low prioritisation of improved cookstoves may result from limited household awareness of potential benefits. For example, one household interviewee in Nsanje suggested that her neighbours "are not fully aware of the benefits which improved cooking technologies would bring".
Improved water access and availability emerged as a local priority not considered within project design: a development goal which can also contribute to adaptation owing to the sensitivity of water security to flooding and drought in Malawi (GoM, 2006) . In one Dedza study village and one Kasungu study village, 24% and 38% of survey respondents respectively considered poor water access and availability to be a significant problem for their households. The Village Head of the Dedza study village explained how households had relocated to a new village site 20 years ago. The current village location has no infrastructure for accessing water but the previous village location had become inhabitable due to its high susceptibility to flooding. Five interviewees in one Kasungu village reported that households rely on shallow wells dug close to a nearby stream. However, wells take a long time to refill once emptied, especially in the afternoons and in the dry season. Large queues form to access them at peak times. Other households commute to a trading centre where the nearest borehole is located. Two interviewees reported that they must make a three to four hour round trip at least twice a day; reducing time available to engage in productive livelihood activities.
DISCOVER PVCA findings also reveal water access and availability as an important and projects. This is further evidence that local preferences were secondary to professional stakeholder preferences within the Design Space.
Discussion
The analytical framework developed and applied here has enabled comprehensive evaluation of the procedural justice implications of ECRP project design. By incorporating a holistic power analysis, the framework furthers understanding of the contextual factors which delimit stakeholders' procedural justice opportunities. To date, tools for conducting procedural justice evaluations have been underdeveloped
and CCD research has not holistically considered how power shapes stakeholder participation and recognition. Hence, the framework offers a unique contribution to the CCD literature. Its use focussed data collection and allowed for comparison and amalgamation of data gathered from dissimilar sources. It can be used by academics and practitioners to unpack and systematically critique CCD design, both at and beyond the project-level. Procedural justice spaces which succeed CCD design can also be evaluated using the framework (e.g. those facilitating stakeholder engagement in implementation and monitoring and evaluation).
In the following, we discuss our results in relation to climate change and development research. Research objectives 2 and 3 are used to guide the discussion before recommendations for encouraging procedural justice through CCD design project are presented.
Stakeholder priorities for CCD design
Considerable overlap existed between different stakeholder priorities for ECRP project design. Donors, NGOs and government representatives prioritised the achievement of CCD triple-wins; delivered through packages of mutually-reinforcing communityand ecosystem-based project activities -an increasingly popular approach (Reid, 2015) . Local people's preferences for project design translated into the pursuit of double-wins across development and adaptation. Overall, they perceived most ECRP development and adaptation goals as important for improving their lives. Common ground could encourage multi-stakeholder working and therefore constitute a previously unidentified driver for advancing CCD (see Ellis et al., 2013 for other drivers). Stakeholders' dissimilar access to knowledge and resources mean it is difficult for them to achieve CCD goals alone (Dyer et al., 2013) . Subak, 2000; Jindal et al., 2008; Boyd et al., 2007) . In such cases, incorporating mitigation activities within CCD design presents an ethical dilemma which is seldom discussed in existing climate justice debates. If incorporated, populations will unwittingly take action to help solve a problem for which they have negligible responsibility but is already exacerbating their vulnerabilities . However, as shown here, mitigation activities may be associated with locallyvalued benefits. Mitigation finance can also help augment traditional aid funding and provide extra resources for reducing these vulnerabilities (Ellis et al., 2013) .
Psychological theories suggest that people in extreme resource-poverty prioritise the achievement of material benefits over procedural freedoms (Inglehart, 1971) .
Donor and NGO employees suggested that mitigation is achieved as a co-benefit of ECRP development and adaptation activities. However, activities which create mitigation benefits (solar lighting, improved cookstoves) were the least prioritised by local people, especially the most vulnerable households living in the most climate sensitive areas. In areas where water access and availability was poor, activities focussed on improving the situation would have been more highly prized. Donor prioritisation of mitigation benefits may have crowded out opportunities for pressing local priorities to be pursued through ECRP projects. Mustalahti et al. (2012) raise the same concerns about REDD+ projects in Tanzania.
Further points of contention between stakeholders may be obscured by power dynamics within project design spaces. Apparent and considerable overlap between different stakeholders' priorities is surprising because CCD operates in a context of uncertainty and value plurality (Curry and Webster 2011; Sen 2009 ). However, NGO dependence on external funding creates an invisible power dynamic which allows donor expectations to shape their activities, both in ECRP and elsewhere (Schmitz et al., 2011; Chahim and Prakash, 2014) . Government dependence on external budget support enables donor preferences to permeate national policy positions (Swedlund, 2013; Hayman, 2009 ). There are also suggestions that local people often suppress their 'true' preferences and confirm project developers' convictions in order to maintain relations and increase their chances of receiving benefits (Leach and Fairhead, 1994; Chambers, 1995) .
Invisible power presents a challenge for advancing CCD. Inherent uncertainty and diverse stakeholder priorities means CCD design is an unstructured policy problem in which 'facts' are disputable and simple, 'correct' solutions unattainable (Hurlbert and Gupta 2015) . Accordingly, design decisions should be predicated on iterative social learning processes in which diverse stakeholder preferences are considered and critiqued. Social learning can encourage decision-making which is contextuallyappropriate and has widespread stakeholder buy-in (Collins and Ison, 2009 ). The suppression of government, NGO and local preferences threatens to undermine this process, reducing the chances that CCD will: be well-suited to local conditions and constituencies (Leventon et al., 2015) ; encourage local involvement during implementation; and generate life-changing outcomes (Hendrickson and Corbera, 2015; Larrazábal et al., 2012) . Overall, suppressed preferences undermine prospects for achieving effective, efficient and just CCD.
Stakeholder recognition and participatory opportunities
Social learning also requires that stakeholders are recognised and have adequate opportunities to shape knowledge co-production (Hurlbert and Gupta, 2015) .
However, ECRP project design was 'top-down' and donor-led, with only selective involvement of other stakeholders. Studies of other integrated climate and development interventions report similar design procedures (Sova et al., 2015; Atela et al., 2015; Leach and Scoones, 2013) .
Visible, hidden and invisible forms of power create barriers to procedural justice in CCD design. This research reinforces the findings of other studies which show that visible powerlessness curtails the involvement of local people and government representatives within project design (Stringer et al., 2012; Mathur et al., 2014; Gustavsson et al., 2014) . NGO funding constraints prevented the majority of target households from taking part in ECRP PVCAs and an absence of guiding policy frameworks restricted government involvement. The literature also points to other instances of where stakeholders' hidden powerlessness mean they are unable to influence design decisions (Benessaiah 2012; Atela et al. 2015) .
Invisible power has not been accounted for within the study of CCD projects. Yet research from Malawi shows that it influenced the extent to which stakeholders considered each other worthy of recognition and participatory opportunities. Donors recognised NGOs as technical decision-makers. On account of concerns about misplaced priorities and limited capacity, donors and NGOs recognised government representatives as information providers. Local preferences were considered secondary to professional stakeholders' 'expert' knowledge. Households were only able to rubber-stamp decisions already made. Project processes are therefore at odds with prevailing development discourses which stress that local people should be recognised as "active agents of change" (Sen 2009: xiii) . Sova et al. (2015) suggest that climate responses are systemically biased against local interests because surrounding discourses perceive indigenous knowledge as unsuitable for dealing with 'uncertainty'. This could undermine local recognition through CCD.
Lessons for current and future CCD project design
Based on research findings and the literature, four recommendations are now presented to help encourage procedural justice and avoid injustice through CCD project design:
I. Put local priorities first
The crowding out of local priorities by supralocal design preferences compromises procedural justice but may also demotivate people from taking part in project implementation. In turn, this reduces the chances that CCD will meaningfully improve peoples' lives or offer value-for-money. Climate change is often only one amongst many vulnerability drivers for developing world populations and may not be the most destructive in the short-term. Designing activities which address local development priorities can therefore be crucial for encouraging local people to undertake mitigation and adaptation activities which generate longer-term benefits (Reid et al., 2009 ).
Therefore, advancing CCD requires that local priorities become central to project design.
In this context, participatory needs assessments remain an important tool for integrating a range of local priorities within CCD design. However, this is contingent on assessments being well-targeted, robust and reflexive.
II. Make participatory assessments robust and reflexive
Methodological limitations mean project developers' reluctance to make participatory assessment results central to CCD project design is unsurprising. Small sample sizes (a result of budgetary and resource constraints) mean findings from ECRP and other project assessments are not generalisable and may have overlooked diverse preferences (Kalame et al., 2011; Awono et al., 2014) . Greater provision of resources is required to facilitate robust participatory assessments which avoid tokenism.
Ongoing global economic underperformance and associated donor apathy (Bhattacharyya, 2013) could undermine this. However, private sector funding can help projects find sufficient time and money .
CCD should follow the lead of ECRP projects which used flexible categories to help local people classify their priorities and vulnerability. This is preferable to the use of
closed categories or open-ended questions for revealing 'true' preferences (Alkire 2005) . Peer pressure, domination of powerful voices and self-censorship of controversial views can reduce the expediency of focus groups (Lloyd-Evans, 2006).
One-on-one interviews that purposively target vulnerable individuals and households can help ensure that assessments consider diverse local priorities. Harnessing indigenous knowledge can facilitate innovation when local people are able to suggest solutions for overcoming local vulnerabilities (Nyong et al., 2007) . Incorporating nonlinguistic processes is important when tacit understandings are an important source of local knowledge (Mohan, 2006) . Opportunities should be provided to allow local people to feedback on prospective project designs (Alkire 2005) .
III. Take steps to reconcile world views
To avoid misrecognition through the incorporation of mitigation in CCD design, efforts should be made to reconcile the world views of local people and other stakeholders. invest the necessary effort to encourage successful mitigation and adaptation actions when they are aware that climate change is human-induced (Mutabazi et al., 2015) .
There is no single optimum co-learning method. What is important is that reconciliation processes enable stakeholders to identify, classify and understand worldviews held by themselves and others. This will rely on project staff acknowledging the subjectivity inherent in CCD design decisions (Raymond et al., 2010) .
As discussed, local people may in some cases be unable to give their full, informed consent for mitigation activities if this requires that they understand and assimilate a scientific worldview. Explaining the value positions behind, and complexities inherent in, carbon trading may present particular problems when market funding mechanisms are utilised (Granda, 2005) . In such cases, project developers must make decisions which result in ethical trade-offs between procedural and distributive justice. However, proceeding with activities which create mitigation benefits would seem sensible providing they are adequately designed to also facilitate substantial and locally-valued development and adaptation gains.
IV. Harness knowledge co-production between professional stakeholders
Knowledge co-production between professional stakeholders can strengthen CCD design . Donors offer financial resources contingent on democratic mandates from developed country populations. Their global reach makes them wellplaced to help integrate CCD projects in particular places with innovative learnings from elsewhere. However, opportunities for NGO and national and local government representatives to offer unfettered strategic insights are required to ensure projects offer locally-appropriate solutions to overcome vulnerabilities alongside optimal resource allocations within the domestic context (Leventon et al., 2015) .
Donors must accept that empowering stakeholders through co-production may result in their own disempowerment (Chambers, 1995) . Barriers to this may be created when invisible belief systems mean donors hold unfavourable cognitive framings of other stakeholders (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2002) . Positive perceptions of government representatives require that they avoid malpractice. A recent spate of arrests followed allegations that public officials in Malawi have been systematically misusing public funds (Anders, 2015) . Such incidents make donors wary of trusting governments with project resources and taking steps to enhance their capacity to do so.
Conclusion
Study of projects which pursue CCD triple-wins in Malawi has revealed that donor agencies are driving design processes and that other stakeholders are only selectively recognised. Opportunities for local people to participate and achieve recognition are particularly constrained. This results in procedural injustices but may also restrict project abilities to achieve effectiveness, efficiency and distributive justice benefits.
Considerable overlap between stakeholders' 'revealed' priorities could help advance CCD. However, divergent world views and suppression of 'true' preferences could lead to misrecognition and prevent projects from improving local peoples' lives.
Visible, hidden and invisible forms of power create barriers to stakeholder participation and recognition in CCD design. We suggest four recommendations to help policymakers and practitioners overcome these barriers and facilitate patterns of procedural justice: 1) put local priorities first; 2) make participatory assessments robust and reflexive; 3) take steps to reconcile world views; and 4) harness co-production between professional stakeholders.
These recommendations are unlikely to be sufficient to eliminate procedural injustices unless stakeholders, and especially local people, are considered worthy of recognition and participatory opportunities. Our findings suggest that local priorities are considered secondary to those of other stakeholders. Gaining deeper analytical insight into this invisible power dynamic is a pressing priority for further study. Subsequent research findings and lessons presented here are crucial to facilitate CCD project design which challenges, rather than exacerbates, socio-cultural and political drivers of underdevelopment.
